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FOREWORD
This manuscript focuses on the present threat
posed by terrorist and insurgent use of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) as well as the associated future
threat potentials identified. The work presents a counterintuitive analysis in the sense that armed drones
are typically viewed as a component of America’s
conventional warfighting prowess—not a technology
that would be used against U.S. troops deployed overseas or against civilians back home. Utilizing a red
teaming approach, the author, Dr. Robert J. Bunker, a
past Minerva Chair at our institution, investigates the
emerging threat of such UAV use. His unique analysis and creative approach, especially when related to
the threat scenario variants generated, make for very
informative reading.
The work is divided into an introduction to the
topical area, a UAV historical overview and discussion of present use by the U.S. military, a chronological narrative of terrorist and insurgent UAV use (and
attempted use) from 1994 through 2015, the ensuing
baselines and trending identified, and the foreseen potentials derived from these trends—based upon tactical, operational, and strategic influencing scenarios,
and the resulting military implications and suggested
policy responses this will entail. The analysis not only
has immediate value for Army force protection and
counterterrorism programs, but also for research being conducted on projected robot-on-human force-onforce engagements in insurgency type environments,
as well as strategic considerations related to emerging
“drone swarm” concepts and the changing character
of warfare as robot Landpower technologies evolve
and are increasingly fielded.
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The Strategic Studies Institute hopes that the analysis and recommendations found in this monograph
will be of use to the various U.S. Army organizations
impacted by nonstate threat UAV use and those entities in sister services also so effected, as well as domestic policing and federal law enforcement bodies tasked
with counterterrorism and homeland security missions. Further, other Army and sister service entities,
as well as various U.S policymaking bodies, hopefully
will find the larger implications posed by this report
related to semi-autonomous and autonomous UAV
type robotic systems of some benefit.
		
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Derived from the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
use threat scenarios, three levels of military significance are foreseen with terrorist and insurgent activities associated with these devices. Because of the
technologies that will eventually be associated with
UAVs—robotics and expert (and artificial intelligence)
systems networked together—their significance is projected as increasing over time from the tactical to the
operational and then to the strategic levels of concern.
These levels of military implication and the suggested
policy responses related to them are:
Tactical.
The impact of even singular terrorist UAV use at
this level is viewed as an immediate- and near-term
problem. It may represent more of a domestic security
issue than an overseas basing or deployment threat—
although such weaponized devices could just as easily be utilized for terrorism purposes overseas against
service personnel and their families as they could be
used against civilians in the United States. The tactical
level threat derived from the drone-up shooting, improvised explosive device (IED) crowd targeting, and
aircraft takedown scenario variants will be of concern
to domestic law enforcement, homeland security, and
Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task
Force elements as well as the military.
Operational.
This level of impact is insurgency environment
focused and pertains to the use of groups of human
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controlled and semi-autonomous UAVs. The virtual
martyrs and drone squadron scenario variants portrayed the various types of flying IED, weapons platform, and human insurgent fighter combined arms’
hybrid threats that could be encountered at this level
of concern. While conceivably representing a present-day operational risk scenario as the technologies
exist for insurgents to utilize UAVs in this way, this
is much more likely a near futures issue that could
still be some years out on the horizon before nonstate opposing forces even contemplate or attempt
such attacks.
Since no terrorism component is readily foreseen
but rather force-on-force engagements are being focused upon, this is not viewed as a domestic law enforcement and homeland security concern. Rather,
it is an Army and allied services expeditionary concern bridging the tactical into the operational level
of impact.
Strategic.
While the drone swarms of normal and microsized UAVs projected in this threat scenario may still
be a few decades out and possibly even beyond the
capacity of terrorist and insurgent forces to field on
their own without state sponsorship, now is the time
to attempt to get ahead of such developments and
help shape the future combat environment. At a minimum, we may presently be in an inter-war period, as
experienced between World Wars I and II, when the
various elements leading to a Revolution in Military
Affairs took place with the evolution of the tank and
supporting arms that resulted in the mass armor and
mechanized formations that fought in World War II.
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In this instance, similar disparate elements, involving robotics, expert systems, artificial and collective
(cloud-like based) intelligence, network communications, and 3rd and 4th dimension (3D and 4D) replicators may be ushering in another revolution in land
warfare involving both ground and aerial based unmanned vehicles and systems.
UAVs have increasingly been in the news as the
cost of these systems continues to drop and their popularity increases. A few million of these systems are
now said to exist globally, with the numbers rapidly
increasing. Recent stories highlighting UAVs have
caused quite a bit of sensationalism and have been
focused on increasing concerns over their terrorism
potentials. Interestingly, serious concerns over terrorist use of UAVs, and later insurgent use of UAVs (that
includes terrorism as an insurgent tactic), have existed
for roughly over a decade, but such concerns had not
been widely disseminated by the media until recently.
The U.S. Army and the rest of the U.S. governmental defense community have a vested interest in better
understanding this area of threat concerns and potentials. While terrorist and insurgent use (and projected
use) of UAVs is important for its homeland defense
and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) implications, it is also—and quite possibly more importantly—likely to have great influence on the conduct of
future forms of conventional warfighting. The reason
for this contention is because, ultimately, UAVs represent artifacts belonging to the ongoing informational
and robotics revolutions that have been taking place
for decades. The significance of advances in information systems and robotics and what this will mean to
future warfighting have not been lost on the Strategic
Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College or on
other U.S. defense policy institutions.
xi

With these thoughts in mind, this monograph
will provide context related to a short UAV historical
overview and their present use by the U.S. military, a
section on terrorist and insurgent use (and attempted
use) of UAVs, UAV baselines and trending analysis,
potentials based on projected UAV threat scenarios,
what this may mean in terms of U.S. military implications, and finally suggested forms of policy response
at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
The first military use of UAVs dates back to World
War I when early tests were carried out—one in 1917
by the United Kingdom (UK) involved a radio-controlled Sopwith Camel biplane loaded with dynamite.
In World War II, about 15,000 UAVs were built in
one Southern California plant alone for anti-aircraft
targeting purposes. U.S. military interest and use of
UAVs waxed and waned during the Cold War. UAV
use then drastically increased due to Section 220 of the
National Defense Authorization Act, FY 2001 (from
2000) which mandated the fielding of unmanned air
and ground vehicles, combined with the September
11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Towers and the
Pentagon, resulting in the use of armed drones in increasing numbers in the global war against al-Qaida.
Terrorist and insurgent use (and attempted use) of
UAVs spans the 1994 Aum Shinrikyo cult’s attempt
to use weaponized drones through the 2015 Islamic
State (IS) use of these craft for reconnaissance and propaganda video purposes. Such groups are still very
much in an experimental phase of using these craft
and possess relatively few of them, and—when they
do have them in their inventories—they tend to be
inferior commercial models (as opposed to military
grade UAVs). Still, their use by terrorist and insurgent groups is increasing, as are the capabilities of
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the systems being deployed. During that time span,
al-Qaida, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army, Fatah, Hizbollah, Lashkare-Taiba, and Hamas have all been involved in actual
or attempted UAV use. The purpose of this use has
included reconnaissance and surveillance, messaging, IED delivery, weapons of mass destruction
delivery, and as a weapons platform. Other UAV
capabilities that exist—yet have not been tied to terrorist or insurgent use so far—are smuggling, limited
electronic intelligence capability, logistical resupply,
and surrender of opposing force personnel. Recent
technology trends that may influence future nonstate
threat potentials are smart glasses and virtual reality
goggles, apps and modular payloads, expert systems
and artificial intelligence, and three-dimensional (3D)
printing.
Transitioning from present baselines of terrorist and insurgent use of UAVs, along with technology trends influencing their potential uses, three red
teaming threat scenarios have been created for early
warning purposes: 1) Single UAV—human controlled
with drone-up shooting (like a walk-up shooting),
IED crowd targets, and aircraft takedown variants, 2)
Groups of UAVs—human controlled or semi-autonomous with squad-sized virtual martyr units and semiautonomous drone squadron variants; and 3) Swarms
of UAVs—considered as autonomous to highlight the
projected evolution of this weaponry use with drone
swarm and micro-drone swarm variants.
These three threat scenarios result in three corresponding levels of impact found at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of military significance. For
the U.S. Army, the tactical implications of such UAV
use will fall within force protection, counterterrorism,
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and defense support of civil authorities’ missions. It
will focus on UAV detection, countermeasures, and
tactical response and is an immediate concern. The
operational level of impact is insurgency environment
focused and most likely a near futures issue. It pertains
to the use of groups of human controlled and semiautonomous UAVs and represents an expeditionary
concern bridging the tactical into the operational level
of impact. This means that experimentation and red
teaming is warranted related to threat forces’ use of
UAVs in insurgency type environments. The strategic
level of concern, on the other hand, may still be a few
decades out, and possibly even beyond the capacity
of terrorist and insurgent forces to field on their own
without state sponsorship. Still, its autonomous and
semi-sentient drone swarm potentials are viewed as
having an immense impact on the future conduct of
war. Considerations need to be made concerning arms
control regimes related to such autonomous, intelligent, and lethal robotic systems as well as their integration with human soldiers into future force structures, if that Army unit composition is elected to be
followed—which presently appears to be the national
trajectory.
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TERRORIST AND INSURGENT UNMANNED
AERIAL VEHICLES: USE, POTENTIALS, AND
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), sometimes
called simply “drones,” have increasingly been in the
news as the cost of these systems continues to drop
and their popularity increases.1 At present, a few million of these systems are said to exist globally, with the
numbers rapidly increasing.2 Recent stories highlighting UAVs have caused quite a bit of sensationalism
and have been focused on increasing concerns over
their terrorism potentials. Such stories have included:
•	In London, a December 2014 governmental confirmation of an earlier incident of a UAV almost
hitting an airliner at Heathrow Airport followed by ongoing illegal drone flights over city
landmarks and sports stadiums in 2015.3 These
incidents have increasingly sensitized the public and officials to drone terrorism threat potentials—even including those to United Kingdom
(UK) nuclear plants.4
•	A small quadcopter that penetrated Secret Service security and crash-landed on the White
House lawn on January 27, 2015. It turns out
the UAV was being flown for recreational purposes by a U.S. Government employee around
midnight who said that he lost control of the
device (known as a flyaway).5
•	Mystery UAVs flying over Paris in late-February and early-March 2015 then created a minihysteria in a city already on edge from the earlier mid-January Charlie Hebdo, supermarket,
and printing firm gun battles involving radical
Islamist terrorists proclaiming allegiance to
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al-Qaida and the Islamic State (IS).6 While the
UAV intrusions were shown to have no terrorism links, the psychic damage had already
been done—much of the French public now realize that terrorists could use drones for future
attacks.
Interestingly, serious concerns over terrorist use
of UAVs, and later insurgent use of UAVs (that includes terrorism as an insurgent tactic), have existed
for roughly over a decade but such concerns had not
been widely disseminated by the media until recently.7 The U.S. Army and the rest of the U.S. governmental defense community have a vested interest in better
understanding this area of threat concerns and potentials—not because they have now been sensationalized
but because of the underlying early warning patterns
that they have been generating for some time.
While terrorist and insurgent use (and projected
use) of UAVs is important for the Army’s homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities
(DSCA) implications, it is also—and quite possibly
more importantly—likely to have great influence on
the conduct of future forms of conventional warfighting. The reason this contention is being made is
because ultimately UAVs represent artifacts belonging to the ongoing informational and robotics revolutions that have been taking place for decades.8 Such
artifacts, when utilized for conflict and war, are, of
course, not only being employed by violent nonstate
actors but also by sovereign states. States, indeed,
have almost totally monopolized this combat capability until quite recently. In fact, the United States and
its allies have been without peer in their utilization of
UAVs since September 11, 2001 (9/11), to target and
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engage a number of the terrorist and insurgent groups
identified in this monograph and even, at times, using UAVs against targets associated with the sovereign states which sometimes harbor these terrorists or
insurgents.
The significance of advances in information systems and robotics and what this will mean to future
warfighting have not been lost on the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College or on other
U.S. defense policy institutions.9 In December 2015,
Dr. Steven Metz wrote a short yet prescient essay
about the coming Landpower robot revolution and
provided five questions related to its first phase based
on early innovation and experimentation:
1. What is the appropriate mix of humans and
robots?
2. How autonomous should the robots be?
3. What type of people will be needed for robot
heavy Landpower formations?
4. What effect will robot centric Landpower have
on American national security policy?
5. What to do about enemy robots?10
This monograph addresses some of Metz’s questions in the areas of projected enemy (terrorist and
insurgent) UAV (robot) capabilities and their level of
autonomy. Also, some mention of envisioned threat
forces of mixed humans and robots will be highlighted. While this discussion will not specifically
provide guidance related to future American robot
Landpower, it may help to provide some analytical
preconditions for such an effort. With these thoughts
in mind, this monograph will provide context related
to a short UAV overview and their present use by the
U.S. military, a section on terrorist and insurgent use
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(and attempted use) of UAVs, UAV baselines and
trending analysis, potentials based on projected UAV
threat scenarios, what this may mean in terms of U.S.
military implications, and finally suggested forms
of policy response at the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels.
UAV OVERVIEW
PRESENT U.S. MILITARY USE
The first military use of UAVs dates back to World
War I when early tests were carried out—one test in
1917 by the UK involved taking a radio-controlled
Sopwith Camel biplane loaded with dynamite to see
if it could be made to ram into one of the German zeppelins, the craft that were then bombing British cities.
The demonstration had to be scrapped due to radio
command and control failures which almost resulted
in a group of gathered generals on the ground being
killed by what had then become a rogue UAV diving towards them.11 Testing continued on and off by
the United States, the UK, and others over the ensuing years with drone use for anti-aircraft targeting
practice becoming common in the 1930s.
In World War II, about 15,000 UAVs were built
in one Southern California plant alone for such purposes.12 Attempts at creating unmanned B-17 and
B-24 bombers, which were conceptually based on the
earlier World War I Kettering Bug concept—to dive
into highly defended German military-industrial targets—were also attempted. These drones were beset
with numerous issues—including the fact that they required human operators to get them airborne and arm
their explosive charges prior to bailing out from the
planes—and achieved very limited results. The Germans utilized drones in a different way, with 8,000 of
4

their infamous V-1 flying bombs being launched later
in the war against Britain in an indiscriminate terror
campaign.13
U.S. military interest and use of UAVs waxed and
waned during the Cold War. Reconnaissance drones
were used in Southeast Asia, based on an initial 1962
contract, with over 3,000 missions of the Fire Fly crafts
flown. Then, between 1979-87, the failed Army Aquila
project—which sought to create 780 drones that could
relay operational level battlefield intelligence—resulted in only a few prototypes being produced at a cost
of over $1 billion. One of the limited drone successes
during this era can be attributed to Israel. In its 1982
Bekaa Valley attack on Syrian air defenses (situated
in Lebanon), an initial wave of UAVs triggered the
system, which proceeded to fire its missiles at the decoy drones. While the Syrians were in the process of
reloading their own missiles, a second wave of Israeli
jets came in and fired their radar homing missiles,
wiping out the Soviet derived air defense system.14
Until 9/11, U.S. military drone use existed at a low
yet somewhat steady level, with some of the older Fire
Fly (renamed Lightning Bug) units still in existence
along with the newer RQ-2 Pioneer system fielded
in 1986 and considered vital for battlefield reconnaissance (and later targeting) missions by the various services. Limited chaff and propaganda (leaflet)
dropping missions also took place with some of these
UAVs. Further, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
quietly became involved in influencing UAV fielding
and use from the 1980s onward, with the emergence
of their large Predator surveillance drone (and its dedicated satellite links) in 1994, which was deployed to
the Balkans in the mid- and late-1990s.15
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Section 220 of the National Defense Authorization
Act, FY 2001 (from 2000) established the following initial goal—then changed the equation:
(a) Goal.—It shall be a goal of the Armed Forces to
achieve the fielding of unmanned, remotely controlled
technology such that—
(1) by 2010, one-third of aircraft in the operational deep strike force aircraft fleet are unmanned;
and,
(2) by 2015, one-third of the operational ground
combat vehicles are unmanned.16
When combined with the 9/11 attacks on the
World Trade Towers and the Pentagon, these events
not only resulted in a firebreak promoting future
mandated UAV use by military forces but saw those
systems, along with UAVs belonging to the CIA, used
in increasing numbers in the global war against al-Qaida. Prior to those dual events, only small numbers of
UAVs (estimated at less than 50) were being utilized
by the intelligence community and armed services.
About a decade later, a 2012 Congressional Research
Services (CRS) report entitled U.S. Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS) identified 7,494 Department of Defense
(DoD) UAS platforms in the inventory.17 This number
did not include CIA dedicated units, which conservatively are estimated at 30 but could be somewhat
higher.18 In the CRS report, UAVs now equal about 70
percent of the manned U.S. aircraft inventory (which
stands at 10,767) and are collectively engaged in all of
the following DoD capabilities and missions:
• Anti-Submarine Warfare
• Anti-Surface Warfare
• Battle Management Command and Control
• Electronic Warfare
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• Explosive Ordnance Disposal
• Force Protection
• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
• Maritime Domain Awareness
• Mine Warfare (Naval)
• Organic Mine Countermeasures (Naval)
• Precision Strike
•	Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition.19
As can be seen, the U.S. military is now heavily invested in UAVs for numerous warfighting capabilities
with over 70 years of learning experience associated
with their fielding and use. Sovereign state militaries—both allies and potential belligerents—increasingly are now deploying these systems in an attempt
to catch up to the superior U.S. capabilities in this
technological area. In the following section on terrorist and insurgent use of UAVs, however, it can be seen
that their fielding of these devices is much more of a
haphazard and limited affair. These groups are still
very much in an experimental phase of using these
craft and possess relatively few of them, and—when
they do have them in their inventories—they tend to
be inferior commercial models (as opposed to military
grade UAVs). Still, their drone use is now increasing
as are the capabilities of the systems being deployed.
Terrorist and Insurgent Use of UAVs.
The use, and attempted use, of UAVs by terrorists and insurgents can at least be dated back to the
pre-June 1994 attempts by the Japanese apocalyptic
cult Aum Shinrikyo to conduct dry runs to release
the nerve agent sarin by means of remote controlled
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helicopters with aerial spray systems.20 The attempts
failed as the mini-helicopters crashed during testing,
with that terrorist group going on to utilize different
dispersal methods when they launched their sarin attacks on a Matasumoto courthouse and later on the
Tokyo subway system.21 The latter attack resulted in
about a dozen people killed and 5,500 injured by this
nerve agent.
The next incident related to UAV threatened use
was that of a pre-July 2001 improvised explosive device (IED) attack upon G8 Summit leaders (Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the
United States) in Genoa, Italy, by al-Qaida. This plot
may have only entered the “what if” stage of conceptualization with Osama bin Laden musing about its
potentials as discrepancies exist as to whether the plot
was actually ever put into place.22 Two more al-Qaida
based plots followed: one pre-February 2002 originating out of Pakistan, and the other in June 2002 from
an unspecified location. The first plot tied to Mozzam
Begg sought to launch a drone filled with anthrax
against the English House of Commons. He was sent
to Guantanamo Prison for his involvement but was
later released from custody in January 2005 because
the original charges became questionable.23 The second plot revolved around IED-carrying remote controlled planes being utilized against passenger airlines—though the plot was never said to get beyond
the concept stage.24
Then, in August 2002, a Colombian Army unit
seized nine remote controlled planes from a camp
deep in the jungle belonging to the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group.
The intended use of these planes is unknown, but some
speculation existed that they may have been intended
to carry IEDs.25 This was followed by a Fatah Pales8

tinian plot in December 2002 to conduct IED model
airplane attacks on Jewish sections of Jerusalem. The
plot, which was to involve hundreds of such model
airplanes, never got beyond the flight test stage.26
Three linked incidents in which UAVs were to be
utilized for attack, reconnaissance, and protest purposes subsequently took place. The initial one from
August through December 2003 was a joint effort by a
Hizbollah cell that was supporting the Al Aqsa Martyrs brigade, an arm of Fatah. The intent was to launch
an IED UAV attack on Jewish settlers in Gaza, however, the plot was interdicted by Israeli security forces.27
Then, on November 7, 2004, a Hizbollah drone was
launched from southern Lebanon and engaged in a
20-minute reconnaissance over Nahariya in northern
Israel. The Mirsad-1 drone, provided by Iran, was of
military grade quality with conflicting reports of its
either crashing in the sea off the Lebanese coast or returning back to its Hizbollah base after its reconnaissance flight.28 The final incident took place on April
11, 2005, and involved another Mirsad-1 drone flown
by Hizbollah from southern Lebanon. In this incident,
the drone overflew the northern Israeli city of Acre
as a protest of Israeli airspace violations of Lebanon,
according to Hizbollah. The drone was able to complete its mission successfully and return back to its
Hizbollah base.29
Two Pakistani terrorist group linked incidents then
took place on September 13-14, 2005. In the first, the
Pakistani Army raided an al-Qaida hideout in North
Waziristan. In the raid, they seized a Chinese made
remote control model airplane which was said to be
used for the reconnaissance of Pakistani security forces
prior to attacking them. IED weaponization potentials
of this model aircraft were also mentioned.30 The next
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day, Ala Asad Chandia (Abu Qatada) was arrested in
Fairfax County, VA, for obtaining an MP 1OOOSYS
electronic automatic pilot system for model aircraft.
This Lashkar-e-Taiba trained individual was federally
indicted and subsequently convicted for attempting
to send this technology to that terrorist group for its
drone use in Pakistan.31
In what may or may not be considered a major escalation of terrorist and insurgent drone capabilities, on
August 13, 2006—during the Second Lebanon War—
three Ababil (military grade) Iranian drones supplied
to Hizbollah were launched against Israel from southern Lebanon. Each drone was said to be carrying a 4050 kilogram explosive warhead and was intended for
use against a “strategic target,” according to Hizbollah. The threat was taken seriously enough that F-16
Israeli fighters shot down these UAVs near Tyre in
Lebanon and near Haifa and Western Galilee in Israel.
Upon inspecting the wreckage of some of these craft,
Israel claimed that they were not carrying warheads.32
Between 2006 and May 2012, two al-Qaida incidents and one Taliban UAV incident occurred. In Columbus, OH, during the 2006-07 period (exact dates
unspecified), al-Qaida trained Christopher Paul was
conducting drone research, utilizing a 5-foot-long
model helicopter, for terrorism purposes. He was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in
August 2007 and was subsequently convicted in June
2008 (he took a plea deal that resulted in a shorter sentence).33 In the next incident, which took place on September 28, 2008, Rezwan Ferdaus—an al-Qaida affinity adherent—was arrested by the FBI in Ashland, MA.
He was caught in a terrorist sting operation related to
his plot to drive F-86 Sabre and F-14 Phantom scale
models (with Global Positioning System [GPS] capa-
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bility) loaded with C-4 explosives into the Pentagon
and Capitol buildings. He was convicted for this plot
in 2012 and also took a plea deal, like Paul, for shorter
sentencing purposes.34 Finally, on May 19, 2012, an allied raid on a Taliban base in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, turned up a small drone—possibly a North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Desert Hawk—
along with some IEDs and small arms. The intended
Taliban use of the drone was unknown, quite possibly for reconnaissance purposes, though it appeared
slightly damaged in a photo of the arms cache and no
control unit was found along with it.35
Four more escalatory Hizbollah and Hamas UAV
incidents took place between the latter part of 2012
and mid-2014. On October 6, 2012, Hizbollah sent an
Iranian Ayoub drone over Dimona, Israel—a restricted area which contains that nation’s nuclear weapons
facilities—for reconnaissance purposes. The timing of
the drone incident coincided with Israeli military exercise preparations. Given the sensitivity of this area,
the drone was shot down by an Israeli F-16, although
not until after it had been aloft for some hours.36 Another Hizbollah drone, the type not specified, was
then shot down by an F-16 10 kilometers out to sea
west of Haifa on April 22, 2013. What mission this
UAV was engaging in is unknown.37 A Hamas plot at
a local university to send a UAV carrying explosives
into Israel in October 2013 was then interdicted by the
Palestinian Authority in Hebron.38 In the last of these
incidents, on July 14, 2014, a homemade Hamas drone
was shot down over Ashdod, Israel, by a patriot missile. This 5-foot-long drone was outfitted with small
air-to-ground rockets (per unconfirmed Hamas video
images) and was on its way to engage an undisclosed
Israeli target.39
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The Islamic State (IS) joined the nonstate threat
drone proliferation club with three successful UAV
operations in August and September 2014. The first
incident was on August 23, 2014, near Raqqa province
in northern Syria. It involved the use of a commercial
system—a DJI Phantom FC40 quadcopter—to recon
Syrian Army Base 93 prior to an IS ground assault on
the base. The quadcopter video imagery was subsequently used in IS propaganda videos.40 On August
30, 2014, an unspecified IS drone was used over Falluja, Iraq, to provide imagery of attacks on the city for
online propaganda purposes.41 In the last IS operation
on September 12, 2014, in Kobani, northern Syria, another unspecified drone was used to capture video
imagery of suicide bomber and ground attacks on that
city for propaganda purposes.42
Hizbollah then engaged in a successful drone
strike operation against the al-Nusra Front—an alQaida linked group—near Arsal in northeastern Lebanon on September 21, 2014. Twenty-three al-Nusra
terrorists were said to be killed in this attack, which
was followed up by a group assault—an incident that
has now ushered in terrorist-on-terrorist group based
drone warfare.43 Whether the drone utilized in the attack carried an explosively tipped warhead or carried
air-to-ground rockets (or missiles) is unknown.44 A
final incident involving terrorist and insurgent use of
UAVs occurred on around March 16, 2015, near the
city of Fallujah, Iraq. In that incident, an IS militant
flew a small model aircraft for about 20 minutes. After
the drone landed, the IS operative placed the drone
in the trunk of a car and proceeded to drive off, at
which point U.S. coalition military forces launched an
airstrike destroying the insurgent, the drone, and the
vehicle.45 This incident and all of the earlier ones summarized in this section can be viewed in Table 1.46
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Date

Location

Perpetrator

UAV Type

Use

Outcome

Pre-June 1994

Japan

Aum Shinrikyo

Remote
Controlled
Helicopters

Spray Chemical
Agent (Sarin)

Crashed During
Testing

Pre-July 2001

Genoa, Italy

Osama bin
Laden, al-Qaida
Leader

Remote
Controlled
Airplanes

IED Attack on G8
Summit Leaders

Considered Only;
Not Attempted
(Alleged)

Pre-February
2002

Pakistan

Moazzam Begg,
al-Qaida
Operative

Drone

Launch Drone
from Suffolk with
Anthrax Against
House of Commons

Alleged Plot; Sent to
Guantanamo Prison;
Released in January
2005

June 2002

Not Specified

al-Qaida

Remote
Controlled
Airplanes

IED Attack on
Passenger Airliners

Considered Only;
Not Attempted
(Alleged)

August 2002

Colombia

FARC

9 Remote
Controlled
Airplanes

Unknown; Possibly Weaponized
(IED)

Recovered by Colombian Army Unit
from Remote Camp

December 2002

Jerusalem,
Israel

Fatah

Hundreds
of Model
Airplanes

IED Attacks on
Jewish Sections
of Jerusalem

Conducted Flight
Tests Only

Gaza, Palestine

Hizbollah Cell
(Linked to Al
Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades; Fatah)

UAV

IED Attack on
Jewish Settlers in
Gaza

Interdicted by Israeli
Security Forces

August and
December 2003

Major Chronological Sources: Michael Gips, “A Remote Threat,”
Security Management Online, October 2002; Eugene Miasnikov,
Threat of Terrorism Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Technical Aspects, Moscow, Russia: Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, June 2004, translated into English March 2005, available from
www.armscontrol.ru/uav/report.htm; Jay Mandelbaum and James
Ralston et al., Terrorist Use of Improvised or Commercially Available
Precision-Guided UAVs at Stand-Off Ranges: An Approach for Formulating Mitigation Considerations, ADA460419, Alexandria, VA:
Institute for Defense Analysis, October 2005, available from oai.
dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=
ADA460419; Milton Hoenig, “Hezbollah and the Use of Drones
as a Weapon of Terrorism,” Public Interest Report, Vol. 67, No. 2,
Spring 2014, available from www.fas.org/pir-pubs/hezbollah-usedrones-weapon-terrorism/.

Table 1. Terrorist and Insurgent Use/Attempted
Use of UAVs.
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7 November 2004

Nahariya,
Northern Israel

Hizbollah

Iranian
Mirsad-1
Drone

20-Minute Reconnaissance
Mission

Either a) Crashed
in the Sea Near
Lebanese Shore or
b) Returned Back to
Hizbollah Base

Hizbollah

Iranian
Mirsad-1
Drone

Overflight of
Israeli Communities (Stated as a
Protest of Lebanese Airspace Violations)

Successful Operation; Returned Back
to Hizbollah Base

To Recon
Pakistani Security
Forces Prior to
Attack; Also Weaponized (IED)

Seized in Major Raid
of al-Qaida Hide
Out by the Pakistani
Army

11 April 2005

Acre, Northern
Israel

13 September
2005

North
Waziristan,
Pakistan

al-Qaida

Chinese
Made Remote
Control Model
Airplane

14 September
2005

Fair Fax
County,
Virginia

Ala Asad Chandia
(Abu Qatada);
Lashkar-e- Taiba
Trained

Obtained MP
1OOOSYS—
Electronic Automatic Pilot
System for
Model Aircraft
in April 2002

For Lashkar-eTaiba Terrorist
Group Drone Use
in Pakistan

Indicted and Subsequently
Convicted

13 August 2006

Near Tyre,
Lebanon; Near
Haifa, Israel;
Western Galilee, Israel

Hizbollah

3 Ababil
Drones, Each
With 40-50
Kilogram
Warhead

Against
"Strategic Targets"

All 3 Shot Down by
Israeli F-16s

2006-2007

Colombus,
Ohio

Christopher Paul
(al-Qaida trained)

5-Foot-Long
Model Helicopter

Conducted Drone
Research for Terrorism Purposes

Arrested by FBI and
Convicted (Plea in
2008)

Rezwan Ferdaus
(al-Qaida Affinity)

Scale Models
of F-86 Sabre
and F-14
Phantom Jets
(GPS capability)

IED (C-4 Explosive) Attack on
Pentagon and
Capitol Buildings

Arrested
By FBI and Convicted (Plea in 2012);
Sting Operation

Taliban

Might be
Recovered
NATO UAS
(Desert Hawk
Drone)

Unknown Use Possible Recon.
Found with IED
Materials and
Small Arms

Captured in Raid

Iranian
Ayoub Drone

Recon of
Israeli Nuclear
Weapons Complex & Military
Exercise Preparation

Shot Down by Israeli
F-16 Jet

28 September
2011

19 May 2012

6 October 2012

Ashland,
Massachusetts

Helmand
Province,
Afghanistan

Dimona, Israel

Hizbollah

Table 1. Terrorist and Insurgent Use/Attempted
Use of UAVs. (cont.)
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22 April 2013

Over the Sea
10 Kilometers
West of Haifa,
Israel

October 2013

West Bank,
Palestine

14 July 2014

23 August 2014

30 August 2014

Ashdod, Israel

Near Raqqa
Province,
Northern Syria

Falluja, Iraq

Hizbollah

Unmanned
Drone; Type
Not Specified

Mission Unknown

Shot Down by Israeli
F-16 Jet at an Altitude of 6,000 Feet

Hamas

Plot Centered
at Hebron
University to
Place Explosives on UAV

Fly into Israel to
Engage Unknown
Target(s)

Palestinian Authority
Arrested Plotters
Prior to Launch

Hamas

5-Foot-Long
Homemade
Drone Aircraft
with Small
Rockets
(Unconfirmed
Hamas Video
Image)

Fly into Israel to
Engage Unknown
Target(s)

Shot Down by Israeli
Patriot Missile

Islamic State (IS)

DJI Phantom
FC40
Quadcopter

Recon of Syrian Army Military
Base 93 Prior to
Ground Assault;
Imagery Provided
via IS Propaganda
Video on YouTube

Successful
Operation

Islamic State (IS)

Unspecified
Drone

Propaganda
Purposes; Video
of Attacks in the
City

Successful
Operation

Propaganda
Purposes; Video
Footage of Suicide
and Ground
Attacks

Successful
Operation

Unspecified
Drone

12 September
2014

Kobani,
Northern Syria

21 September
2014

Near Arsal,
Northeastern
Lebanon

Hizbollah

Armed
Drones

Killed 23 al-Nusra
Front (al-Qaida
Successful
Linked) Fighters at
Operation
Base; Followed by
Ground Assault

Appx. 16 March
2015

Near Fallujah,
Iraq

Islamic State (IS)

Unspecified
Drone

Unknown; Possible Reconnaissance or Propaganda Purposes

Islamic State (IS)

Operator and Drone
Destroyed in Car by
U.S. Coalition Air
Strike

Table 1. Terrorist and Insurgent Use/Attempted
Use of UAVs. (cont.)
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BASELINES AND TRENDING ANALYSIS
Derived from the overview of the historical and
contemporary use (and attempted use in plots) of
UAVs by terrorists and insurgents in the preceding
section, the following capabilities gained by using this
technology have been identified.
Reconnaissance and Surveillance.
Initially, the reconnaissance of fixed facilities and
military units was gained by UAV deployment, as
was evident with Hizbollah drone use in November
2004 and October 2012 against Israel. Also, an al-Qaida drone was seized in September 2005 in Pakistan
which would be used prior to launching an attack
(possible use) as was a Taliban drone seized in May
2012 in Afghanistan (possible use). An IS drone was
also used in a reconnaissance role as recently as August 2014 against a Syrian army base in northern Syria
prior to a ground assault upon it. The use of drones for
real time surveillance appears to be a far less common
UAV occurrence for violent nonstate actors, although
real time drone imagery of IS attacks on Falluja, Iraq,
in August 2014 and Kobani, Syria, in September 2014
used for propaganda purposes could conceivably also
be used for command, control, and coordination purposes—but, in those examples, this was probably not
exploited.47
Messaging.
Various forms of messaging (communicating information to others) exist related to UAV use. At the
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most basic level, this can take the form of making a
protest. It was thought that the April 2005 Hizbollah
use of a drone to overfly Israeli communities was primarily meant to signal that an earlier Israeli violation
of Hizbollah airspace in southern Lebanon would not
be tolerated.48 Another form of messaging is that of
propaganda. Propaganda can be directed at both internal and external audiences in terms of drone use
capability and actual use. The use of such propaganda
has been readily capitalized on by al-Qaida, Hizbollah, Hamas, and IS in their online postings and videos.
A third form of messaging is to give a warning. This
is very much akin to the old “shot across the bow,”
which means that deadly force will likely be used next
unless the targeted audience accedes to one’s requested demands. Providing a warning to the other side in
such a manner may also serve as a form of future deterrence against unwanted actions. The October 2012
Hizbollah drone reconnaissance of the Dimona, Israel,
nuclear weapons complex as well as the propaganda
component of the July 2014 Hamas drone incident
(both physical and online) in Ashdod, Israel, that “we
now, too, have armed drones” were meant to threaten
Israel for deterrence and behavioral shaping purposes.
IED Delivery.
Since pre-July 2001, al-Qaida leaders have been
musing about using drones equipped with IEDs for
terrorist attack purposes against Western leaders. AlQaida plots via affinity nodes have also included targeting passenger airliners (June 2002), general testing
(2006-07), and use against key governmental buildings in Washington, DC (September 2011). A Fatah
plot (December 2002) and one intertwined with Hiz-
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bollah (in August and December 2003), along with an
actual Hizbollah incident involving explosive payload
drones (August 2006) shot down before hitting their
targets, have also been identified. More recently, in
September 2014, a Hizbollah drone was used to attack
the al-Nusra Front (an al-Qaida linked group) near
Arsal in northeastern Lebanon (assumed on the Syrian
side of the border). In this successful operation—quite
possibly the first of its kind for a nonstate group—
some 23 al-Nusra fighters in a base were said to be
killed in the attack that was then followed up by a
ground assault. It is unknown if the drone was carrying an explosive payload or utilized an air-to-ground
weapon to destroy the command facility the al-Nusra
personnel occupied.49
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Delivery.
The pre-June 1994 attempt by Aum Shinrikyo to
weaponize a UAV to spray the sarin nerve agent, and
the alleged pre-February 2002 plot by al-Qaida operatives to release anthrax against the House of Commons
in London, UK, suggest that this potential drone capability has long been identified by terrorist groups. The
delivery of radiological materials by means of a UAV
would represent another component of such WMD
capability, though it has not been linked to any known
terrorist plots. Still, such drone WMD use potentials
are widely recognized by security analysts: “Drones
could potentially carry and launch some weapons of
mass destruction—biological and chemical weapons
and even radioactive ‘dirty’ bombs.”50
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Weapons Platform.
Placing rockets and missiles on drones (to mimic
far more robust U.S. drone capabilities) represents
another violent nonstate actor capability that can be
derived from UAV employment. This trend appears
to be relatively recent and may be evident in the
homemade Hamas drone outfitted with small rockets
under its wings in the July 2014 Ashdod incident. This
capability may already be possessed by Hizbollah via
the possible transfer of the armed “Hamaseh” Iranian
produced drone. Since Hizbollah has already utilized
a number of other Iranian drone types in the past, it
takes little imagination to see this new drone ending
up in Hizbollah’s armory. A photo of this drone was
taken in May 2013 and serves as a weapons platform
for two air-to-ground attack munitions.51 Another
more basic capability—that of placing a firearm on a
UAV and using it to shoot at a target—has already taken place. This can be seen in an online advertisement
for smart phone shields in which a pistol attached to a
drone fires at various items, including a smart phone
utilizing the advertised product.52 To date, the placing
of firearms on UAVs has not been tied to any known
terrorist or insurgent plots or incidents, but the potentials are being discussed in online media.53
Other UAV Capabilities.
Other UAV capabilities presently existing that
have not been tied to terrorist and insurgent use or
plots are:
Smuggling: Since at least 2009, numerous examples
exist globally of UAVs being used by criminals and
organized crime to smuggle goods such as narcotics,
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cigarettes, and cell phones into fixed installations such
as prisons, and even across national boundaries.54 Reports suggest that one of the major regions in which
such smuggling has taken place is along the U.S. and
Mexican border. It is being carried out by the Mexican
cartels, with well over 100 incidents said to have taken
place.55 This UAV capability would allow for the raising of revenues via narcotics smuggling by terrorists
and insurgents.
ELINT Capability (Limited): In 2014, a drone was
created to hack mobile devices specifically by means
of finding those with open Wi-Fi network connections
and tricking them into providing data by mimicking
networks they have accessed in the past. This was
done by equipping the drone with the Snoopy software capability.56 This form of ELINT drone can be
used for illicit fundraising (eg., bank account access),
to engage in identity theft in order to compromise
cyber and physical security systems, and for gaining intelligence against individuals for kidnapping
purposes.
Logistical Resupply: The first UAV combat resupply
took place in December 2011 when a K-Max helicopter
adapted by Lockheed brought in supplies to a Marine
base in Afghanistan.57 This program has since continued and now progressed to where a software application (app) is being developed to allow Marines to summon resupply UAVs via tablets and smart handheld
devices. The experimental program is funded through
2018 and, if successful, we could see more widespread
introduction of this system in the 2020s.58 Such a basic
UAV resupply capability would mean that frontline
advancing or besieged insurgent fighters could also
potentially benefit from food and ammunition supplies being flown into them via modified commercial
UAV systems.
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Surrender of Opposing Force Personnel: During the
Gulf War, in late-February 1991, a small group of Iraqi
troops surrendered to a U.S. Pioneer RQ-2A drone on
Faylaka Island near Kuwait City rather than face another bombardment of 16-inch shells from the U.S.S.
Missouri. The low flying drone was being used as a
spotter via a video link back to the Missouri for targeting and battlefield damage assessment of the defending Iraqi forces.59 This was the first time in history that a group of soldiers have ever been known
to surrender to a robot in war. While a terrorist group
may or may not find such a UAV capability useful,
it may have utility for an insurgent group that is
attempting to capture a city.
Recent technology trends that may bolster UAV
functionality suggest that the following enabling
technologies may also influence future terrorist and
insurgent potential uses.
Smart Glasses and Virtual Reality Goggles: UAVs
are typically flown using handheld controllers like
those used for model airplanes, with the pilot observing the drone from a distance. This form of stand-off
piloting is functional when the UAV is being flown
in noncomplex terrain such as in open fields, and to
a limited extent over urban areas, when pilot line-ofsight is maintained. An immediate drawback to this
method of UAV control is pilot perspective—they
are viewing the drone from afar—which reduces its
tactical maneuverability and handling. To overcome
this limitation, hobbyist and commercial UAV pilots
have taken to using smart glasses (with see-through
lenses that have computer imagery projected on
them) and virtual reality goggles and visors that create computer-generated three-dimensional (3D) simu-
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lations of what a drone sees in front of it via a video
camera system.60 This merges the perspective of the
stand-off pilot with the UAV—in essence, placing him
in the drone or allowing him to become the drone (as
a “virtual martyr”)61 for flight control purposes. The
end result is that tactical mobility greatly increases as
can been seen in a clip of drone races through a forest
in Argonay, France, which was posted on YouTube in
September 2014 and has been widely viewed.62
Apps and Modular Payloads: The trend towards
open architecture systems—“Plug-N-Play”—will
mean that UAVs can be quickly configured for different uses via apps and payload modularity (hardware).
One off-the-shelf method in this regard is to attach a
smart phone (eg., iPhone or Galaxy) to a UAV in order
to gain new forms of functionality for various uses.63
Novel smart phone apps of interest include GPS fencing which would designate a limited geographic area
that a drone could only fly within for patrol or seeking purposes64 and an infrared video attachment that
would allow a drone to be flown under the cover of
darkness and also pick up target body heat signatures.65 Payload modularity means that a drone could
transition from cargo hauling through reconnaissance
through serving as a weapons platform or as an actual
aerial IED as required.
Expert Systems and Artificial Intelligence: One of the
limitations of UAV use is that the systems have to be
constantly monitored and controlled by human beings.
It is expected that expert systems (“if-then statement”
decision point) and artificial intelligence (scenario
maximizing) drone controllers will also be employed.
The mission value is in some ways equivalent to utilizing a wire-guided missile that the operator needs to
keep on target as opposed to a fire-and-forget weapon
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that can be launched and then does not require human
interaction to guide it to the target. The ability to send
out an autonomous UAV to complete a simple mission
already exists—such as for a computer program to fly
a drone and take some form of basic action.66 The use
of such semi-independent and independent systems
would also get around limitations in controller signal
range—extending drone flying distances—and would
likely allow for far quicker reaction cycles to changing operating conditions (e.g., machine decisionmaking and flight corrections are faster than that of human beings). Additionally, machine based groups and
swarms of drones can operate together in coordinated
(intelligent) networks, which is beyond the capability
of groups of human controlled UAVs.67
3D Printing: Entire UAVs, except for certain motor
and command and control parts, can now be created
by 3D printers. The first printed drone parts—in this
instance, for a model aircraft—were created in 2011 by
Southhampton University and took a week to print.68
By 2014, drone components could be printed in less
than 24 hours, as was done by a Sheffield University
team.69 Later that year, a military grade fully autonomous drone (with an Android phone brain), the Razor 3, was printed for the MITRE Corporation, a DoD
contractor, with off-the-shelf parts for $2,500 in just
over a day by the University of Virginia.70 In tandem
with these developments is the 3D printing of a firearm, which took place in 2013 based on a primitive design (the plastic Liberator) while, in November 2013,
a metal M1911 pistol was printed using an industrial
3D printer.71 A projected capability to regularly print
higher strength metal components, in addition to plastic and composite components, is expected once the
technology to do so becomes economically feasible.
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This will mean that the 3D printed core components of
a drone outfitted with various forms of weaponry will
at some point become a reality. An urban street culture
video linking 3D printed guns and drones, gangsters,
narcotics, and violence together should also be noted.
It can be found in the video, Double Bubble Trouble,
released by rap singer Mathangi “Maya” Arulpragasam, known as M.I.A., in her 2013 album, Matangi.72
The concern, of course, is that these technology linkages are being spread to demographics that may include disenfranchised Western youth susceptible to
ongoing terrorist radicalization initiatives.
POTENTIALS—THREAT SCENARIOS
Transitioning from present baselines of terrorist
and insurgent use of UAVs, along with technology
trends influencing their potential uses, three red teaming threat scenarios have been created for early warning purposes: 1) Single UAV—human controlled, 2)
Groups of UAVs—human controlled or semi-autonomous, and 3) Swarms of UAVs—autonomous to highlight the projected evolution of this weaponry use (See
Table 2.). Each threat scenario will be discussed, along
with the expected time frame in which it may take
place and its probable significance to U.S. national
security and military operations.
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Threat Scenario

Time Period

Description

Significance

1: Single UAV—
Human Controlled

Present Day

Tactical action utilized to create a
terrorism incident. Scenario variants:
Drone-up Shooting, IED Crowd Targeting, and Aircraft Takedown

Tactical (+Terrorism
Disruptive Potentials)

2: Group of UAVs—
Human Controlled
or Semi-autonomous

Present Day
Near Futures
(Some Years)

Force-on-force engagement in insurgency environment. Scenario variants:
Squad-sized Virtual Martyrs Unit and
Semi-autonomous Drone Squadron

Operational

3: Swarm of
UAVs—
Autonomous

Futures (A Few
Decades)

Robotic targeting of human personnel,
materiel, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels
in conflict and war. Scenario variants:
Swarms and Micro-Swarms

Strategic

Table 2. Terrorist and Insurgent UAV
Use Threat Scenarios.
Threat Scenario 1: Single UAV—Human controlled.
In this threat scenario, a single human controlled
UAV is utilized in a tactical action for terrorism purposes. Precedent exists for such an incident derived
from past terrorist plots and activities tied to al-Qaida
and its wider web of affinity-linked individuals. Such
a scenario is presently achievable with current offthe-shelf technologies. Three scenario variants will be
provided to showcase the diversity of terrorist attacks
that can be carried out via a single human operated
UAV.
Drone-up Shooting.
In this scenario variant, a low and slow flying drone
is utilized for assassination purposes in order to kill a
political leader, general officer, or other very impor-
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tant person. Since a firearm was successfully placed
and fired from a small UAV in 2013; the only difference this scenario would require is the engagement of
a human rather than an inanimate object. The requirements to conduct this attack would be to determine
the route and time frame of the targeted individual
in order to send the drone out to the appropriate outside ambush location. A video link can be maintained
between the operator and drone, and the simple command of having the trigger of the firearm pulled can
be sent digitally. A laser pointer can also be added for
accuracy purposes.
IED Crowd Targeting.
The second variant represents an area rather than
a point target type of drone attack. As in the previous example, a video link and a simple command—in
this instance, that of detonation—can be utilized with
a UAV carrying an IED. The intent would be to have
the drone fly into a crowd of individuals and detonate
among them. This would mimic the effects of a terrorist grenade or IED attack on a grouping of people. An
effective use of this form of attack would be to attack
crowds in a sports stadium or along a parade route in
order to generate panic and create a stampede and/or
crowd crush-type situation. Follow-on drones, even if
unarmed, could be utilized to create the illusion of a
coordinated attack for terror generation purposes.
Aircraft Takedown.
Of the three highlighted variants, this one—targeting a passenger airliner or military jet or transport—
could be said to best maximize single human operator
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UAV capabilities. Rather than utilizing a quad or other
form of slow commercial drone, it would draw upon
the speed and kinetic ability of hobbyist scale model
jets. The intent of this form of attack is to simulate a
“bird strike” on an aircraft engine while an airliner or
jet aircraft is taking off and most vulnerable to catastrophic flight failures.73 Such a UAV strike would be
far more serious than a bird strike due to superior kinetic effects. Model jets can achieve speeds well over
100 mile per hour and have more mass than birds74 and
can be augmented with a penetrator rod (composed of
a metal or composite material) running the length of
a hobbyist jet.75 As no explosive or form of armament
would be required for such an attack—other than a
video link for engine targeting purposes—it would be
considered a pre-existing off-the-shelf capability.
The significance of this threat scenario (and its variants) ranges from minimal to low in its implications.
A drone-up shooting simply represents a variant of
a political assassination, while IED crowd targeting
mimics a traditional bombing, both of which can be
utilized for terrorist (against civilians) and insurgency
(against police and military) purposes. The difference,
of course, is a standoff between the perpetrator, i.e.,
the UAV operator, and the UAV being utilized as a
weapons platform to carry a firearm or as a delivery
system to carry an IED. The flight ability of a UAV,
however, may allow it access to venues, such as a
sports stadium, where an armed human attacker cannot gain entrance due to security screening protocols.76
The aircraft takedown variant, however, is different in
that a human attacker is precluded from gaining access to an aircraft during takeoff due to both airport
and airbase security and the fact the aircraft is in its
initial flight stage. This means that utilizing a drone to
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engage in such an attack represents a new capability
that can be directed against civilian airliners for terrorism purposes within the continental United States
(CONUS) and against military aircraft for insurgency
purposes outside CONUS deployed areas.77 Ultimately, however, all of these scenario variants leverage the
disruptive potentials terrorism has to offer and, while
based upon tactical actions, should be considered terrorist attacks first and foremost in their effects.
Threat Scenario 2: Group of UAVs—
Human Controlled or Semi-autonomous.
No groups of UAVs have as of yet been utilized
together in a conflict setting by violent nonstate actors, such as terrorists or insurgents, so no historical
precedent for this threat scenario exists. Rather, it is
based on a linear trend projection derived from hobbyist racing for human controlled UAVs and commercial applications derived from various apps being
integrated into semi-autonomous drone systems. The
first variant, based on the virtual martyrs concept,78
pertaining to this threat scenario is viewed as a current capability (which may or may not be exploited by
Jihadist insurgent groups), while the second variant,
highlighting the use of a group of semi-autonomous
drones, is expected to become technically feasible in
the near future. These scenario variants include the
following.
Squad-sized Virtual Martyrs Unit.
This is a squad-sized UAV unit composed of racing
drones outfitted with IEDs controlled by virtual reality linked human controllers. The intent of this unit is
to attack U.S. and allied soldiers and security person28

nel by detonating the IED drones once they come into
the proximity of their targets. A sub-variant of such
drones would be ones outfitted with either shaped
charges or explosively formed projectiles (EFP) that
would be utilized for the precision targeting of U.S.
and allied armored vehicles.79 Inhibitors to the use of
such virtual martyr drones include video feed and
controller communication range limitations, signal
dead zones, short drone battery life, and IED weight
restrictions. This unit can be utilized in a stand-alone
mode with only virtually controlled IED carrying
drones involved or in a combined arms fashion as ad
hoc support to human insurgent fighters and/or integrated with a semi-autonomous drone squadron.
Semi-autonomous Drone Squadron.
Such a squadron represents a small grouping of
drones launched together in an assault wave. It would
draw upon both the drone-up shooting (firearm carried) and IED crowd targeting (bomb carried) single
UAV scenarios, with the addition of autonomous
drone capability. The drones can be sent against police and military personnel located at a GPS coordinate. The drones would be provided with GPS fencing
instructions to patrol within certain physical boundaries and engage (via weapons firing or IED detonation) humans and/or moving objects that they come
across using human form or motion sensors. Human
controllers have the option of taking over individual
drones for engagement purposes as required. An ambush variant of this scenario variant would be to have
these UAVs resting in a “drone nest” (essentially a box
buried at ground level) that would open when opposing troops lacking identification friend or foe tags trip
sensors during entry into an area.
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This scenario and its variants are not about creating terror per se—which may still occur as a secondary outcome—but instead focus on the generation of
combat power in force-on-force engagements found
in insurgency environments.80 As a result, the direct
implications of this scenario are at the military operational level in which groups of drones serve as
a) physical avatars for humans virtually controlling
them, or b) machine soldiers controlled by expert systems, both of which directly engage human soldiers in
combat. This scenario is thus meant to be reflective of
the changing patterns of conflict and war in which the
5th dimension of cyberspace (via physical space-time
manipulation)81 and unmanned systems are beginning
to increasingly influence operations.82 The significance
of this scenario would likely be limited in scope initially with increasing importance up to a moderate
level of threat represented by the semi-autonomous
drone variant when (or if) it is realized.83
Threat Scenario 3: Swarm of UAVs—Autonomous.
While this threat scenario may sound like something from a science fiction novel, the technologies that
would allow swarms of autonomous drones to operate
on the future battlefield are already being developed.
One experiment in this regard is being conducted by
Hungarian civilian researchers with the COLLMOT
Robotic Research Project who have “created 10 drones
that self-organize as they move through the air.”84 In
one example, these drones overcome an obstacle by
maneuvering in line through a choke point. While
the researchers strive that this experimentation is for
peaceful pursuits, the military benefits of increasingly larger groups of drones that can self-organize in
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order to fulfill mission requirements is readily apparent. Similar experimentation is ongoing with U.S. Office of Naval Research experiments, which are presently up to 13 autonomous and remote controlled
swarming robot boats. As for the desired project counterterrorism end state, “The Navy officials envision
swarms of unmanned surface vehicles . . . being used
to form a defensive perimeter around larger ships and
to surround enemy ships.”85 Based on this projected
threat scenario, two variants, utilizing swarms of
normal and micro-sized drones, are foreseen.
Drone Swarms.
The full-sized autonomous UAVs incorporated
into this scenario variant are meant to destroy major
elements of U.S. power such as the military aircraft
situated at an air base, the armored vehicles belonging to a brigade combat team, or a major capital ship
such as an aircraft carrier. A massive drone swarm—
with each semi-intelligent drone networked together
and outfitted with an explosive warhead—would be
launched against such military targets in this scenario
variant. In the case of the targeting of an aircraft carrier, this eventual threat may be considered equivalent in scale to the sinking of captured German battleship Ostfriesland in July 1921 by U.S. Army Air Service
aircraft under the command of Brigadier General
William “Billy” Mitchell. This experiment helped to
prove that aircraft carriers would eventually eclipse
battleships as the principle capital ship of navy forces
and suggests, in the present case of drone swarm potentials, that some sort of stealthy drone carriers may
at some point eclipse aircraft carriers as major surface
naval combatants.
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Micro-drone Swarms.
The micro-drones that form the basis of this threat
scenario variant are meant to be utilized for anti-personnel rather than anti-materiel purposes. Such UAVs
range in size from small flying insects to that of palmsized devices equivalent in size to small birds.86 Such
micro-UAVs can be outfitted with a host of traditional
weapons—small guns and explosives—as well as unconventional armaments such as incapacitators, poisons, and nerve agents.87 In this scenario variant, these
devices would be intended for urban terrain with the
micro-swarms utilized against opposing U.S. soldiers.
Of concern is the Anti-Access/Area Denial potentials
of such projected micro-drone swarms; however, these
UAVs are presently far too sophisticated for insurgent
groups to develop, much less field.
It is assumed that over time the dozen or so autonomous drones that can presently self-organize will continue to increase in size into larger and larger groupings. At what point a large enough grouping of drones
technically becomes a “swarm” is undefined. From a
biological perspective, honeybee swarms range from
a few thousand bees into the low tens of thousands.
As an arbitrary threshold, real drone swarms might
therefore be said to require at least a thousand or so
individual UAVs. The operational fielding of such
swarms on the battlefield may be viable within 2 decades.88 While the threat represented by a few hundred weaponized drones is significant, thousands of
autonomous self-organizing UAVs operating on the
battlefield would have immense U.S. national security
implications.
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It should be noted, however, that the futures represented by Threat Scenario 3 may or may not be beyond the capability of a terrorist or insurgent group
devoid of state or multinational sponsorship. As a
result, this capability from a threats perspective may
only be available to advanced states such as China or
Russia, technologically sophisticated multinational
corporation equivalent powers, or their terrorist or
insurgent proxies.
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS AND
POLICY RESPONSE
Derived from the UAV use threat scenarios, three
levels of military significance are foreseen with terrorist and insurgent activities associated with these devices. Because of the technologies that will eventually
be associated with UAVs—robotics and expert (and
artificial intelligence) systems networked together—
their significance is projected to increase over time
from the tactical to the operational and then to the
strategic levels of concern. These levels of military implication and the suggested policy responses related
to them follow.
Tactical.
The impact of even singular terrorist UAV use at
this level is viewed as an immediate- and near-term
problem. It may represent more of a domestic security
issue than an overseas basing or deployment threat—
although such weaponized devices could just as easily be utilized for terrorism purposes overseas against
service personnel and their families as they could be
used against civilians in the United States. The tactical
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level threat derived from the drone-up shooting, IED
crowd targeting, and aircraft takedown scenario variants will be of concern to domestic law enforcement,
homeland security, and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force
elements.
For the U.S. Army, the tactical implications of such
UAV use will fall within force protection, counterterrorism, and defense support of civil authorities’ missions. It will focus on UAV detection, countermeasures,
and tactical response. Like civilian law enforcement,
the Army will be required to generate new capabilities
to mitigate this potential threat. Such response may be
as simple as utilizing shotguns in a skeet shooting role
that substitute a hostile UAV for a clay disk and/or
the inclusion of slightly more involved shotgun ammunition modifications such as less-lethal rounds (eg.,
baton or multiple-impact with wire lines) for use in
urban environments. Stringing up wires to stop access
into open venues or in flight choke points may prove
to be other hasty anti-drone protocols that may need
to be considered if hostile UAV use becomes evident
in an area of operations. More advanced measures
being considered by the Army in this regard include
a new Barrett 25 millimeter anti-drone rifle that has
been developed, and electronic warfare systems that
had initially been created for counter-IED use, while
the Marine Corps is developing a vehicle mounted
high power laser.89
Since such UAV threat potentials represent a common problem for local, state, and federal law enforcement as well as the Army and other services, it would
be prudent for such groups and agencies to form joint
working groups to address the tactical concerns such
terrorist use could pose. Allied military and federal
policing bodies, such as those belonging to Canada,
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should be considered for inclusion in such working
groups. Additionally, from an Army perspective, the
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point might
represent a natural choice to track ongoing terrorist
and insurgent UAV interest and use while the various branch bulletins (e.g., Infantry and Military Police)
could promote UAV countermeasures and response
thinking.
Operational.
This level of impact is insurgency environment focused and pertains to the use of groups of human controlled and semi-autonomous UAVs. The virtual martyrs and drone squadron scenario variants portrayed
the various types of flying IED, weapons platform,
and human insurgent fighter combined arms hybrid
threats that could be encountered at this level of concern. While conceivably representing a present-day
operational risk scenario as the technologies exist for
insurgents to utilize UAVs in this way, this is much
more likely a near futures issue that could still be
some years out on the horizon before nonstate opposing forces even contemplate or attempt such attacks.
Since no terrorism component is readily foreseen
but rather force-on-force engagements are being focused upon, this is not viewed as a domestic law enforcement and homeland security concern. Rather, it
is an Army and allied services expeditionary concern,
bridging the tactical into the operational level of impact. This means that experimentation and red teaming is warranted related to threat forces use of UAVs
in insurgency type environments. Small scale exercises
in which red team virtual martyr and drone squadron
groups (utilizing UAVs containing paintball grenades
and simulated small arms firing) are pitted against
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Army infantry squads and platoons (also armed with
marking rounds). These exercises are advocated for
threat baseline and projection determination purposes.
Competitions between Army personnel with the technical skills to create such commercial threat system
based quads and related drone systems and the development of the red team concepts to utilize them operationally should also be considered to support such an
effort.
Given the foreseen impact at the operational level,
the Army effort to develop such small scale UAV red
team exercises might best be initially coordinated via
programs at the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, and supported
by writings meant to generate awareness, discussion,
and debate at the Military Review level of professional
writing.90 Given ongoing U.S. Naval Postgraduate
School interest in UAV experimentation, a liaison to
their programs should also be established. Ultimately, the limited scale red teaming exercises advocated
could be held at any number of Army training venues such as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, or the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center,
Butterville, IN.91
Strategic.
While the drone swarms of normal and micro-sized
UAVs projected in this threat scenario may still be a
few decades out, and possibly even beyond the capacity of terrorist and insurgent forces to field on their own
without state sponsorship, now is the time to attempt
to get ahead of such developments and help shape the
future combat environment.92 At a minimum, we may
presently be in an inter-war period, as experienced
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between World Wars I and II, when the various elements leading to a revolution in military affairs took
place with the evolution of the tank and supporting
arms that resulted in the mass armor and mechanized
formations that fought in World War II. In this instance, similar disparate elements, involving robotics, expert systems, artificial and collective (cloud-like
based) intelligence, network communications, and 3D
and 4D replicators may be ushering in another revolution in land warfare involving both ground and aerial
based unmanned vehicles and systems.
Given the strategic impact potentials of such aerial
(and ground) drone swarms on the future conduct of
war, research and writing is required to be vested at
the U.S. Army War College level of analysis and policy formulation. Papers derivative from this present
effort and earlier ones are needed, as well as shorter
essays written for Parameters, to highlight concerns,
debates, and insights related to robot autonomy and
Landpower.93 Considerations need to be made concerning arms control regimes related to such autonomous, intelligent, and lethal robotic systems94 as well
as their integration with human soldiers into future
force structures if that Army unit composition is elected to be followed, as presently appears to be the national trajectory. Further, given the Joint Force nature
of American warfighting, the debate on such autonomous robotic systems and drone swarms needs to be
expanded to the other senior service war colleges as
well as equivalent level allied nation defense educational institutions.95
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